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Abstract 
The AGM theory of belief revision has be­
come an important paradigm for investigat­
ing rational belief changes. Unfortunately, 
researchers working in this paradigm have re­
stricted much of their attention to rather sim­
ple representations of belief states, namely 
logically closed sets of propositional sen­
tences. In our opinion, this has resulted in 
a too abstract categorisation of belief change 
operations: expansion, revision, or contrac­
tion. Occasionally, in the AGM paradigm, 
also probabilistic belief changes have been 
considered, and it is widely accepted that 
the probabilistic version of expansion is con­
ditioning. However, we argue that it may be 
more correct to view conditioning and expan­
sion as two essentially different kinds of belief 
change, and that what we call constraining is 
a better candidate for being considered prob­
abilistic expansion. 
1 Introduction 
The AGM theory of belief revision (Giirdenfors 1988, 
1992) has become an important paradigm for inves­
tigating rational belief changes. In this theory, three 
main types of belief changes are distinguished, namely 
expansion, revision, and contraction. Expansion is the 
most simple type of belief change, partly because it 
is supposed to occur only when information is added 
which is consistent with the previously held beliefs, 
whereas the other types of belief changes (also) apply 
in case the new information is inconsistent with the 
old beliefs. 
In fact, if logical theories are used to represent the 
belief states, then an explicit definition of expansion 
can be given: The result of expanding a theory K 
with a sentence ¢ is the set Cn(K U { ¢}) of logical 
consequences of K U { ¢}. In general, no such explicit 
definition can be given for revision and contraction. 
When these types of belief changes are studied in the 
context of probabilistic belief states, at first sight, con­
ditioning seems to be the obvious probabilistic variant 
of expansion. We argue that closer inspection shows 
that conditioning and expansion are best viewed as 
two essentially different types of belief changes. This is 
most clear in the context of partial probability theory, 
where both types of belief changes can be compared. 
In our view, conditioning is a type of belief change dif­
ferent from expansion, revision, and contraction. Con­
ditioning does not make sense in the context of belief 
states represented by logical theories, just as expan­
sion does not make sense in the context of belief states 
represented by probability functions. Expansion and 
conditioning both make sense in the context of belief 
states represented by partially determined probability 
functions, since they allow the representation of both 
ignorance and uncertainty. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first review several 
models of belief states, including belief sets and (par­
tial) probabilistic models. Next, we discuss the notions 
of expansion and conditioning in the different contexts, 
and we provide several arguments for our opinion that 
these notions are essentially different, and that con­
straining is better suited than conditioning to be con­
sidered probabilistic expansion. In (Voorbraak, 1996), 
we briefly discuss the probabilistic variant of revision, 
but in this paper we restrict ourselves to expansion. 
We conclude with a discussion of the question how to 
determine whether either conditioning or constraining 
is appropriate. 
2 Belief State Models 
Throughout the paper, L denotes a propositional lan­
guage with the usual connectives -,, V, 1\, --+, +->, and 
constants .l and T. For simplicity, we assume that L 
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has finitely many propositional letters Pl, P2, . . . , Pn. 
We write SL for the set of sentences of L and we use 
¢, 1/J, . . .  as sentential variables. 
We further assume 1- to denote the standard proposi­
tional consequence relation on SL and Cn to denote 
the associated consequence operation. (If S � SL, 
then Cn(S) = {¢ E SL : S 1- ¢}.) A setS� SL is 
called logically closed iff S = Cn( S). 
Definition 1 (belief set) A belief set K for L zs a 
logically closed consistent subset of SL. A sentence ¢ 
of L is called accepted in K iff¢ E K. 
For technical convenience, the inconsistent belief state 
(containing all sentences of the language) is sometimes 
added to the considerations. However, in this paper, 
the rational belief states are assumed to be consistent. 
A sentence a E SL is called an atom of L iff a = 
'lr1/\'lr2/\ . . .  1\'lrn, where for each i E {1, . .. , n}, 'lr; = Pi 
or rr; = -,Pi. Notice that if n is the number of propo­
sitional letters of L, then the number N of atoms of 
L equals 2n. A belief set K for L can be represented 
equivalently by the set of all atoms of L which are 
consistent with K. Since atoms can be identified with 
possible worlds, this is called a possible worlds repre­
sentation of belief states. 
The belief sets and the possible worlds models are es­
sentially equivalent, but there exist many other essen­
tially different models of belief states. For example, 
probabilistic models can be used to represent degrees 
of belief in propositions, as opposed to belief sets which 
only model whether a proposition is (fully) accepted 
or not. 
Definition 2 (probabilistic model) A probabilis­
tic {belief) model P for L is a probability function on 
SL, that is, P is a function on SL satisfying the fol­
lowing three conditions. 
1. For all¢ E SL, P(¢) 2:: 0 
2. For all¢ E SL, if I-¢, then P(¢) = 1 
3. For all ¢,1/J E SL, ifl- --.(¢/\ 1/;), then P(¢V1j;) = 
P(¢) + P(l/J). 
A sentence ¢ of L is called accepted in P iff P( ¢) = 1. 
We write P ROB(SL) for the class of probability func­
tions on SL. With every probabilistic model P for L 
one can naturally associate the belief set t( P) for L 
given by t(P) = {¢ E SL: P(¢) = 1}. It is easy to see 
that t(P) is indeed a belief set and that in t(P) the 
same sentences are accepted as in P. The belief set 
t( P) is called the top of P. Of course, different proba­
bility functions may have the same top. The belief sets 
for L correspond exactly to the equivalence classes of 
probabilistic models for L with the same top. 
In other words, with every belief set K for L one 
can naturally associate a class of probability functions. 
Since also a probabilistic belief model P for L can be 
naturally associated with a class of probability func­
tions, namely { P}, it follows that using classes of prob­
ability functions as models of belief states naturally 
incorporates the previously defined models. 
Definition 3 (partial probabilistic model) 
A partial probabilistic model II for L is a non-empty 
class of probability functions on SL. A sentence¢ of L 
is called accepted in II iff for every P E II, P( ¢) = 1. 
Let i be the function embedding belief sets and prob­
ability models into partial probability models in the 
way mentioned above. That is, i assigns to a be­
lief set K for L, or probability function P on SL, 
the class of probability functions on SL compatible 
with K, or P. Thus, i(K) = {P E PROB(SL) : 
if¢ E K, then P(¢) = 1}, and i(P) = {P}. 
The previously introduced function t for taking the 
top of a probability function can naturally be ex­
tended to partial probabilistic models as follows. If 
II is a class of probability functions on SL, then 
t(II) = {¢ E SL: for every P E II, P(¢) = 1}. Notice 
that t( i( P)) agrees with t( P) as previously defined, 
and that t( i(K)) = K. 
Partial probabilistic models are of technical interest, 
since they generalise both the belief sets and the prob­
abilistic models. In addition, it can be argued that 
in some situations, in particular when there is ig­
norance concerning the exact likelihood of events, a 
class of probability functions is more appropriate to 
model a belief state than a single probability function. 
Classes of probability functions are also mentioned in 
(Gardenfors, 1988) as possible belief state models. 
We conclude this section by pointing out that a par­
tial probabilistic model can be viewed as some kind of 
possible worlds model for a probabilistic language. Let 
LPROB be a language for probabilistic reasoning with 
L as object language for the probability expressions. 
We use SLPROB to refer to the sentences of LPROB, 
and 1-PROB and GnP ROB denote a probabilistic conse­
quence relation and associated consequence operation 
on SLPROB. We assume that the sentences of L are 
not sentences of LPROB, but occur only in the scope 
of the probability operator of LpROB. For example, 
one can take LPROB to be (a suitable adaptation of) 
L( AX) or L( AXFo) of (Fagin et a!., 1988), and use 
AXMEAS or AXFo-MEAS of the same paper as the 
probabilistic logic. 
Sentences of LPROB can be viewed as constraints on 
probability functions on S L, much as sentences of L 
can be viewed as constraints on possible worlds for L. 
Thus, any setS<::; SLPROB determines a partial prob­
abilistic model for L. Of course, S and CnPROB(S) 
determine the same model. Hence there is an ex­
act correspondence between (probabilistic) belief sets 
for LPROB and classes of probability functions deter­
mined by subsets of SLPROB. For any such class II, 
let (II) denote the belief set S for LPROB such that 
II= {P E PROB(SL): P satisfies S}. We will some­
times use P I= S as an abbreviation for 'P satisfies 
S'. 
Although, in general, a class of probability functions 
cannot be expected to correspond to a (probabilistic) 
belief set for LPROB, it seems likely that any natural 
occurring class is determined by a set of sentences of 
some probabilistic language. Therefore, a probabilistic 
belief set may be an interesting representation of a 
belief state. 
3 Conditioning and Constraining 
Let K be a belief set for L and let ¢ E S L be consistent 
with K, or, in other words, �¢ not accepted in K. 
Then the belief in ¢ can be added to the belief state 
K without giving up any old beliefs. In the AGM 
theory, such a kind of change in belief state is called an 
expansion, and is modelled by the operation + given 
by K + ¢ = Cn(I< U {¢}). 
If we use a probability function P on S L as our rep­
resentation of belief state, then conditioning seems a 
natural candidate for the role played by the operation 
+ on belief sets. 
Definition 4 (conditioning) Let P be a probability 
function on SL. Define, for each ¢ E SL such that 
P(¢) :f 0, the function P¢ as follows. 
P(¢ 11 1/J) 
For every .p E SL, P¢(.P) = P(!f;J¢) = P(¢) · 
It is easy to check that the thus defined function P¢ 
is a probability function on SL. The mapping from 
P to P¢ is strongly related to expansion with ¢, since, 
just as the expansion operation, the mapping is defined 
whenever �¢ is not accepted in the original belief state 
(P(�¢) :f 1), and we have t(P)+¢ = t(P¢)· It follows 
that the expansion operation + on belief sets can be 
viewed as an abstraction of Bayesian conditioning on 
probabilistic belief states. 
However, the expansion operation on belief sets can be 
viewed as an abstraction of many other operations on 
probabilistic belief models as well, including preserva­
tive imaging introduced in (Gardenfors, 1988). The 
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question arises whether compatibility with + is suffi­
cient for an operation on probabilistic belief models to 
qualify as a probabilistic expansion. This question is 
perhaps even more relevant in the context of partial 
probabilistic belief models, where even more opera­
tions are compatible with the expansion of belief sets. 
The following definitions describe two such operations. 
Definition 5 (extended conditioning) Let II be a 
partial probabilistic model for L, and let¢ E SL, such 
that for some P E II, P( ¢) > 0. Define the partial 
probabilistic model II¢ for L as follows. 
II¢= {P¢: P E II, P(¢) > 0}. 
Definition 6 (constraining) Assume that II is a 
partial probabilistic model for L and that¢ E SL, such 
that for some P E II, P( ¢) = 1. Define the partial 
probabilistic model II&¢ for L as follows. 
II&¢= {P E II: P(¢) = 1}. 
These, or similar operations have been studied before. 
See, for example, (Dubois and Prade, 1997). In (Grove 
and Halpern, 1998), both conditioning and constrain­
ing, and several other ways of updating sets of proba­
bility measures, are discussed from an axiomatic point 
of view. 
The following proposition shows that constraining and 
extended conditioning are both compatible with + on 
embeddings of belief sets. 
Proposition 1 Let II be a partial probabilistic belief 
model for L such that II = i( K), for some belief set 
K for L, and let ¢ E SL such that �<P fl. K. Then 
t(II&¢) = t(II¢) = t(II) + ¢. 
Although both operations are compatible with expan­
sions of belief sets, we consider constraining to be the 
proper probabilistic notion of expansion, whereas (ex­
tended) conditioning is in our opinion best viewed as 
a new kind of operation, different from both expan­
sion. (It is of course also different from the other AGM 
operations, revision and contraction, since these are 
intended for incorporating new information which is 
inconsistent with the previously held beliefs.) In the 
following section, we give several arguments support­
ing this view. 
4 Conditioning versus Expansion 
We argue that constraining and not conditioning 
should be considered to be probabilistic expansion, 
smce 
1. constraining, and not conditioning, can be viewed 
as expansion of probabilistic belief sets 
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2. constraining can be said to (primarily) reduce ig­
norance, just like expansion, whereas condition­
ing is (primarily) connected with reducing uncer­
tainty. 
This latter difference between conditioning and con­
straining will only be discussed briefly in general 
terms, but a concrete manifestation of this difference 
will be treated in more detail: like expansion, and in 
contrast to conditioning, constraining can be used to 
obtain any belief state from a state of ignorance while 
preserving intermediate results. 
4.1 Expansion of Probabilistic Belief Sets 
We argue, that, in contrast to conditioning, constrain­
ing can be viewed as expansion of probabilistic belief 
sets. First notice that constraining can also be defined 
for sentences of LPROB instead of L. 
Definition 7 (generalised constraining) Let II be 
a non-empty class of probability functions on SL. De­
fine, for each ¢> E SLpROB which is satisfied by some 
P E II, 
II&</>= {P E II: P � ¢>}. 
This definition of constraining generalises definition 6, 
since II&</>, for ¢> E SL, can be viewed as an abbrevi­
ation of II&(P(</>)=l). Further on, we will also discuss 
an analogous generalisation of conditioning. The fol­
lowing proposition shows that the generalised version 
of constraining translates into the expansion of prob­
abilistic belief sets. 
Proposition 2 Assume that S is a probabilistic belief 
set for LPROB· Let II be the partial probabilistic belief 
mode/for L such that (II)= S, and let¢> E SLPROB be 
consistent with S. Then (II&¢) = CnPRoB(S U {¢>)}). 
Corollary 3 Let II be a partial probabilistic belief 
model for L such that (IT) = S, and let ¢> E SL such 
that for some P E II, P(¢>) = 1. Then (II&¢} = 
CnPROB(S U {P(¢>) = 1}). 
The following example shows that the analogue of 
this corollary for conditioning does not hold, provided 
CnPROB is monotone, and LPROB is nontrivial, in 
the sense that it allows assigning (probability) values 
between 0 and 1. 
Example 1 Let p and q be the proposition letters of 
L, and let II be the partial probabilistic belief model for 
L such that (II} = CnPRoB( {P(pl\q) = x, P(pl\..,q) = 
0} ), for some x between 0 and 1. Then (IT} contains 
P(p) = x, whereas (IT9) does not. 
Conditioning is not just a matter of adding informa­
tion and possibly sharpening the bounds on probabil­
ity values. Conditioning may also involve the revision 
of previously held degrees of belief, even if one condi­
tions on events which are completely consistent with 
the old belief state. The possibility that conditioning 
is perhaps not a 'pure' expansion process since it has 
some aspects of a revision process has already been 
mentioned in (Dubois and Prade, 1992). 
4.2 Reducing Uncertainty or Ignorance 
We claim that constraining can be said to (primar­
ily) reduce ignorance, whereas conditioning is (primar­
ily) connected with reducing uncertainty. To make 
this more precise, one needs measures of both un­
certainty and ignorance, preferably in the contexts of 
partially specified probability. Obtaining and justi­
fying such measures is not easy, although some work 
has been done in this area. See, for example, (Klir, 
1994) for a discussion of such measures in the context 
of Dempster-Shafer theory. 
In (Voorbraak, 1996) we propose provisional measures 
for uncertainty and ignorance in the partial proba­
bilistic case. The uncertainty measure is based on en­
tropy and the ignorance measure is based on the (av­
erage) difference between upper and lower probability 
of events. 
These measures are provisional, and cannot be justi­
fied rigorously, but they suffice to show that condition­
ing is biased towards reducing uncertainty, whereas 
constraining is biased towards reducing ignorance. 
More precisely, if the uncertainty in a belief state is not 
minimal, then it can always be reduced by condition­
ing, but not always by constraining. If the ignorance 
in a belief state is not minimal, then it can always be 
reduced by both constraining and conditioning, but 
constraining always (weakly) reduces the ignorance, 
whereas after conditioning the ignorance might be in­
creased. See (Voorbraak, 1996) for details. 
Since the expansion operation + on belief sets is aimed 
at reducing ignorance rather than uncertainty, the 
above can be viewed as a second argument in favour of 
the position that constraining rather than condition­
ing is the probabilistic variant of expansion. Below, we 
will consider a more specific version of this argument. 
4.3 Expanding from Ignorance 
Any belief set K for L can be obtained from the ig­
norant belief state Cn(0) by a sequence of expansions. 
(In fact, since L has a finite number of proposition let­
ters, a single expansion suffices.) This is in accordance 
with the intuition that one can learn about a subject 
of which one is completely ignorant, without having to 
give up previously held beliefs. 
Intuitively, one should be able to learn about a sub­
ject in bits and pieces, possibly getting information 
from different sources and on different occasions. In­
deed, starting from the ignorant belief state Cn(0), 
iterated expansion leads to more and more extended 
belief states. This is a monotone process, since the fol­
lowing preservation property holds. Let K be a belief 
set for L, and let 1/;, ¢ E SL such that K, ¢, and 1/; are 
jointly consistent, then 
¢ is accepted in (K + ¢) + 1/;. (1) 
Since for every probability function P on SL and 
¢, 1/; E SL, such that P(¢/\1/;) > 0, we have (Prp)v,(¢) = 
1, the analogous property holds in the context of prob­
abilistic belief models. Here the most obvious candi­
date to represent the ignorant belief state is the uni­
form probability function Pun, defined by Pun(a) = 
tr• where N is the number of atoms of the language, 
and a is any one of these atoms. The following exam­
ple shows that it is not the case that any probability 
function P on SL can be obtained by conditioning the 
uniform probability function Pun on SL. 
Example 2 Let p be the only proposition letter of L, 
and let P be the probability function on SL given by 
P(p) = 0.1. Then P differs from (Pun)p, (Pun),p, 
and (Pun)pv,p(= Pun), which are the only probability 
functions that can be obtained by conditioning Pun· 
This negative result can be circumvented if one gener­
alises the notion of (Bayesian) conditioning by allowing 
conditioning on events which are not certain. Jeffrey 
conditioning is such a generalisation of Bayesian con­
ditioning. Below we first define a simple version of 
Jeffrey conditioning, which we call binary Jeffrey con­
ditioning, for reasons that will become clear further 
on. 
Definition 8 (binary Jeffrey conditioning) Let 
P be a probability function on SL, and let ¢ E SL 
such that 0 < P(¢) < 1. Define, for any x E [0, 1], the 
function Prp,x as follows. 
Prp,x = xPrp + (1- x)P, rp 
Notice that the usual conditional probability function 
Prp = P</>,1. It is easy to see that the probability func­
tion of P example 2 can be obtained from Pun by bi­
nary Jeffrey conditioning: P = (Pun)p,0.1· Binary Jef­
frey conditioning can be generalised in a natural way 
as follows. 
Definition 9 (Jeffrey conditioning) Let P be a 
probability function on SL, and let { ¢; : i E I} be 
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a set of mutually exclusive sentences of L, such that 
for every i E I, P( ¢;) > 0. Define, for any set 
{x; : i E I}, with x; E [0, 1] and Lief x; = 1, the 
function P{(rp,,x,):iEl} as follows. 
P{(rp,,x,):iEI} = L x;Prp,. 
iEI 
Notice that Prp,x = P{(rp,x),(,</>,1-x)}. Hence binary Jef­
frey conditioning is Jeffrey conditioning on two exclu­
sive events. Bayesian conditioning is Jeffrey condition­
ing on a single event and might be called unary Jeffrey 
conditioning. Jeffrey conditioning can be generalised 
even further to allow conditioning on constraints ex­
pressed by sentences of LPROB as follows. 
Definition 10 (minimum cross entropy) 
Assume that a1, a
2
, ... , aN are the atoms of L. Let P 
be a probability function on SL, and let¢ E SLPROB. 
We define Pif>, the minimum cross entropy update of 
P with ¢, to be that probability function P' on SL sat­
isfying ¢ where the function 
( 
1 
) 
� '( ) P'(a;) I P , P = L..... P a; log ---p--( ·) 
i=l Q'� 
is minimal. 
The function (Pun) </> is the probability function satis­
fying ¢ with the maximum entropy. It follows that if¢ 
uniquely determines a probability function P ( P' f= ¢ 
iff P' = P), then (Pun)</> = P. 
It is also easy to show that every probability function 
P on SL can already be obtained from Pun by Jeffrey 
conditioning. In fact, the following proposition shows 
that one does not have to start from the 'ignorant' 
Pun, since (even binary) Jeffrey conditioning allows 
many probabilistic belief states to be changed into an 
arbitrary probabilistic belief state. 
Proposition 4 Let P be a probability function on SL 
and let {a; : i E I} be the set of atoms of L such that 
P(a;) > 0. Assume that P' is a probability function 
on SL such that for every i E I, P'(a;) > 0. Then P 
can be obtained from P' by at most III applications of 
binary Jeffrey conditioning. 
Example 3 Let p and q be the proposition letters of 
L, and let P be the probability function on SL given by 
the table below. Let P' =Pun· Then P1 = (Pun)pvq, 
P2 = P
1
A , , and P3 = PP2 0 9 = P. The different p q,T , . 
probability functions are described in the table below. 
660 Voorbraak 
p/\q 
p 0.4 
P' = Pun 0.25 
P' 
� 
p2 
� 
p� 0.4 
p /\ --.q --.p /\ q --.p /\ --.q 
0.5 0.1 0 
0.25 0.25 0.25 
� � 
0 
,?;, ,?;, 
0 
0.5 0.1 0 
However, the above example illustrates that the men­
tioned generalised notions of conditioning do not sat­
isfy the generalisation of the preservation property (1). 
If¢ and 1/; are allowed to range over SLPROB, then 
¢ is no longer guaranteed to be accepted in ( P¢)1/J· 
Consider, for example, P = P1 from example 3, 
¢ : P(p /\ q) = �' and 1/; : P(p) = 0.9. We con­
clude that conditioning does not allow a preservative 
change of the ignorant belief state into an arbitrary 
belief state. 
In the context of partial probabilistic belief mod­
els for L, the ignorant belief state is represented by 
PROB(SL). It is easy to see that any partial prob­
abilistic belief model determined by a subset S of 
SLPROB can be obtained from PROB(SL) by con­
straining with the sentences of S. In other words, any 
probabilistic belief set S for LPROB can be obtained 
by constraining the ignorant belief state CnpRoB(0). 
Moreover, constraining satisfies the appropriate gen­
eralisation of the preservation property ( 1): 
Proposition 5 Let S = (II) be a (probabilistic) belief 
set for LPROB, and let '1/;, ¢ E SLPROB such that S, ¢>, 
and 1/; are jointly consistent. Then 
¢ is accepted in (II&¢ )&1/J. 
Of course, one cannot constrain ignorance to partial 
probabilistic belief models which are not determined 
by a subset S of SLPROB. Since a similar situation 
arises in the case of expanding belief sets and possi­
ble worlds models of a language with infinitely many 
proposition letters, we do not consider this to be an es­
sential difference between constraining and expansion. 
The situation is much worse for conditioning, since 
very few partial probabilistic belief models can be ob­
tained from PROB(SL) by extended Bayesian condi­
tioning. Given our previous deliberations, it may be 
natural to consider set-extensions of the discussed gen­
eralisations of Bayesian conditioning. For example, for 
any¢ E SLPROB, one can define II,p = { P,p: P E II}, 
where P,p is the minimum cross entropy update of P 
with ¢. The following example shows that this opera­
tion does not satisfy the preservation property. 
Example 4 Assume that p and q are the proposition 
letters of L, and let II= PROB( SL), ¢: P(p/\ q) = 
0.5, and 1/; : P(p) = 0.5. Then II, ¢, and 1/; are jointly 
consistent, but it is not the case that ¢ is accepted in 
(II,p ) 1/l. The following table shows what happens to Pun 
during the updates. 
p/\q p /\ --.q --.p /\ q --.p /\ --.q 
Pun 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
( Pun)¢ 0.5 
� 
� 
� 
((Pun)¢) 1/l 0.375 0.125 0.25 0.25 
Since Pun E PROB(SL), we have ((Pun)¢)¢ E (II,p) .p. 
Hence we cannot have (II,p).p(P /\ q) = 0.5. 
Notice that the example shows that the preservation 
property is not even satisfied by the set-extension of bi­
nary Jeffrey conditioning. We conclude that (iterated) 
expansion has a certain property, namely the possibil­
ity of reaching every (definable) belief state from igno­
rance in a preservative manner, which is also possessed 
by constraining, but not by conditioning. 
5 Conditioning versus Constraining 
So far, we argued that conditioning or constraining 
are two different kinds of operations on belief states, 
where constraining is the proper probabilistic notion 
of expansion, since it is the expansion of probabilistic 
belief sets, and it can model preservative changes from 
the ignorant belief state to an arbitrary belief state. A 
decrease in ignorance is the main effect of constraining, 
whereas conditioning is primarily aimed at reducing 
uncertainty. 
We have left open the question which of the two oper­
ations one should use when receiving information. We 
will discuss this matter using a well-known example 
deriving from (Smets, 1988). 
Example 5 (The three assassins) Mr. Jones has 
been murdered by one of the assassins Peter, Paul, 
and Mary under orders of Big Boss, who has chosen 
between these three possible killers as follows. He de­
cided between a male and a female killer by means of 
tossing a fair coin. A male killer was chosen in case 
the coin landed heads. Otherwise, a female killer was 
chosen. No information is available on how he decided 
between the two male assassins in case the coin landed 
heads. 
Based on the information above, it seems reasonable 
to say that the possibility of the killer being male and 
that of the killer being female are equally likely. Now 
suppose that you learn that at the time of the murder, 
Peter was at the police station, where he was ques­
tioned about some other crime. So you can rule out 
Peter as the killer. How should this new evidence be 
modelled? In particular, is it still equally likely for the 
killer to be male or female? 
To formalise this example, let L be the language with 
the three propositional letters p, q, and r, where p : 
Peter is the killer, q : Paul is the killer, and r : Mary is 
the killer. Given that exactly one of the assassins mur­
dered Jones, only three atoms remain possible, namely, 
a = p 1\ -.q 1\ -.r, f3 = -.p 1\ q 1\ ..,r, and 1 = -.p 1\ -.q 1\ r. 
Adding the information that a fair coin toss decided 
the choice between a 'male and female killer leads 
to the partial probabilistic belief state II = { P E 
PROB(SL) : P(aV(3) = 0.5, P('Y) = 0.5}. This 
agrees with the interpretation in Dempster-Shafer the­
ory, where the information is encoded in the mass func­
tion m given by m (a V (3) = 0.5, m(1) = 0.5, which in­
duces a belief function Bel such that Bel is the lower 
envelope of II. Strict Bayesians will opt for the prob­
ability function P given by P (  a) = 0.25, P (f3) = 0.25, 
and P ('Y) = 0.5, which is the 'least informative' mem­
ber of II. 
How to take account of the information -.p that Peter 
is not the killer? Strict Bayesians use Bayesian condi­
tioning and arrive at P�p given by P�p (f3) == !, and 
P�p('Y) = �. which implies that it is twice as likely 
for the killer to be female than to be male. However, 
as argued by (Smets, 1988) and (Halpern and Fagin, 
1992), the 'least informative' prior P on which this 
answer is based makes some (unjustified) assumptions 
about how the choice between Peter and Paul is made. 
Starting from the partial probabilistic belief state II, 
one can use both constraining and (extended) condi­
tioning. Constraining II with -.p (or P (-.p) == 1) gives 
II&�p = { P  E PROB(SL): P(f3) = 0.5, P ('Y) = 0.5}, 
which implies that the possibility of the killer being 
male and that of the killer being female are still equally 
likely. This answer completely agrees with the answer 
given be Dempster's rule of conditioning in Dempster­
Shafer theory, and is defended by Smets (Smets88). 
Conditioning II with .,.,p gives II�p = { P  E 
PROB(SL) : 0 :S P(f3) :S 0.5, 0.5 :S P ('Y) :S 1, 
P(f3 V 1) == 1}, which implies that the possibility of 
the killer being female is at least as likely as that of 
the killer being male. This answer, which is defended 
by (Halpern and Fagin, 1992), agrees with our intu­
ition that finding out that Peter has an alibi makes 
it less likely that the coin landed heads to a degree 
which equals one's degree of belief that Peter would 
have been chosen in case of heads. The ignorance 
concerning P(p\p V q) makes it impossible to justify 
a specific answer. 
The above is related to a distinction discussed in 
(Dubois and Prade, 1997) between specific informa­
tion, or factual evidence, which concerns a particu­
lar case at hand, and general information, or generic, 
background knowledge, which pertains to a class of sit-
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uations. Constraining is applicable in case of (general) 
information referring to the prior probabilities, and 
(specific) information about the case at hand should 
be incorporated using (extended) conditioning. 
For example, learning Peter's alibi provides specific 
information, whereas a report of an undercover agent 
saying that Big Boss decided to choose Paul in the 
event that a male killer had to be chosen constitutes 
general information. In both cases one learns ..,p, but 
if it is specific information one has to condition on this 
event, whereas one has to use constraining in case the 
information is general. 
The distinction between specific and general informa­
tion is hard to make precise in general, but we find 
the following argument that Peter's alibi is specific, 
and not general, quite convincing. 
Example 6 Assume that in the context of example 5, 
you received a report of an undercover agent saying 
that Big Boss, in the event he has to choose a male 
killer, decides between Peter and Paul by means of a 
(second) fair coin toss. Further assume that this report 
is completely reliable, but that you read it after you 
learned about Peter's alibi. 
The report of the undercover agent tells you that 
P(p)/( P(p) + P(q)) = 0.5. Simply adding this con­
straint to II�p (as previously defined) results in { P E 
PROB( SL) : P ('Y) = 1}, which is counterintuitive, 
and adding the constraint to II&�p is not possible at 
all, since it leads to an inconsistency. However, the 
constraint from the report is a constraint on the prior 
probabilities, not on the probabilities obtained after 
incorporating the evidence of Peter's alibi. 
Adding the constraint to II results in { P}, where 
P is the given by P (a) = 0.25, P(f3) = 0.25, and 
P('Y) = 0.5. Conditioning on the evidence of Peter's 
alibi gives { P�p}, which agrees with the answer given 
by strict Bayesians in the original example, since the 
probability function P is chosen by the strict Bayesians 
even without the information from the undercover 
agent. Notice, however, that it is not possible to use 
constraining to incorporate Peter's alibi in the belief 
state { P}. This supports our opinion that Peter's alibi 
is specific information which calls for conditioning and 
not for constraining. 
It can be shown that the order among conditionings or 
among constrainings does not matter. More precisely, 
if for some P E II, P(¢ 1\ 1/J) > 0, then (II,p).p = II,pA.p 
= (II.p),p, and if 1/>A 'if; is satisfied by some P E II, then 
(II&q, )&.p = II&( if> A 'I>) == (II&.p )&¢. 
In contrast, (IIq,)&.p = (II&.p)q, is not valid, as shown 
by the analysis of the example above. Constrain-
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ing should always be performed before conditioning, 
which implies that after conditioning one should not 
forget about the original belief state, since general con­
straints should be added to this original belief state. 
Usually, one obtains additional information from ob­
servations of some aspects of the particular case at 
hand. This kind of information tends to be specific. 
But in some situations it might be reasonable to search 
for general information. For example, a chief of po­
lice, having the information described in the original 
example 5 of the three assassins, may conclude that he 
should assign at least as many detectives to investigate 
Mary as to investigate Paul. However, to determine an 
optimal division of the available detectives, he might 
try to reduce his ignorance by ordering an undercover 
agent to acquire information about the choice between 
Peter and Paul. 
We conclude that the most common kind of probabilis­
tic evidence is specific evidence about the case at hand, 
and should be incorporated by means of (extended) 
conditioning. Some evidence may be of a general na­
ture and may reduce the ignorance concerning prior 
probabilities. Such evidence calls for constraining. 
6 Conclusion 
We argued that conditioning can best be viewed as a 
type of belief change different from expansion, revision, 
and contraction. This difference becomes most clear 
in the context of belief states represented by partially 
determined probability functions, which allow the rep­
resentation of both ignorance and uncertainty. In this 
context, there are several operations agreeing with ex­
pansion on belief sets. Of these, constraining has more 
right to be called probabilistic expansion, than condi­
tioning has, although the latter is often chosen in the 
literature. 
The principal result of constraining is a decrease in 
ignorance, whereas conditioning is aimed at reducing 
uncertainty. General evidence reducing ignorance con­
cerning the prior probabilities calls for constraining, 
but the most common probabilistic evidence concerns 
the particular case at hand, and should be modelled 
by means of conditioning. Constraining should always 
be applied before conditioning, since it represents evi­
dence concerning the prior probabilities. 
Conditioning does not make sense in the context of be­
lief sets, which do not represent uncertainty, but only 
ignorance, just as expansion does not make sense in 
the context of belief states represented by probabil­
ity functions, which do not represent ignorance, but 
only uncertainty. Our distinction between expansion 
and conditioning calls into question the treatments of 
probabilistic revision which start from the assumption 
that conditioning is the correct notion of probabilistic 
expansion. 
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